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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-FREE EXERCISE
OF

RELIGION-MASSACHUSETTS

TO THOSE

STATUTE

DENYING

BENEFITS

DISCHARGED AS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Reynolds v.

HELD

Dukakis, 441 F. Supp. 646 (D.

Mass. 1977)
David Reynolds received a bachelor's degree from the Univer
sity of Massachusetts shortly before he enlisted in the United
States Coast Guard on December 18, 1968. Early in the summer of
1969, Reynolds was commissioned as an ensign and agreed to a five
year military commitment. He served as a helicopter pilot until
September 9, 1972 when, after three years and nine months of
military service, Reynolds applied for a discharge as a conscientious
objector. 1
Between September 1972 and June 1973, Reynolds was as
signed noncombatant duties. These duties, as well as all duties per
formed before September of 1972, were carried out satisfactorily.
In June, 1973, after fulfilling four and a half years of his five-year
military obligation, Reynolds received an honorable discharge from
the United States Coast Guard. The discharge contained a notation
that conscientious objection was the reason for severance from the
service. 2
In the fall of 1973, Reynolds was accepted into a graduate pro
gram at the University of Massachusetts. He applied for veterans'
educational benefits from the federal government and from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Reynolds, however, received only
federal veterans' benefits. 3 Under Massachusetts law,4 Reynolds
did not qualify as a veteran because he had been discharged as a
conscientious objector and, therefore, was not eligible to receive
educational benefits. 5
l.

Reynolds v. Dukakis, 441 F. Supp. 646, 648 (D. Mass. 1977).

2. Id. at 648-49.
3. Id. at 649.
4. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(43) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1973) defines a "vete
ran" as "any person, ... (a) whose last discharge or release from his wartime service,
as defined herein, was under honorable conditions . . .." The statute further pro
vides that "[nlone of the following shall be deemed to be a "veteran": ... (c) Any
person who was designated as a conscientious objector upon his last discharge or
release from the armed forces of the United States."
5. Reynolds was informed of his ineligibility for veterans' benefits by Robert E.
Feeney, Military Archivist for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in a letter dated
September 26, 1973. After informing Reynolds that he was ineligible for benefits,
Feeney stated that the Department of Education would make the ultimate decision
of whether a tuition exemption certificate would be issued to Reynolds. For an un
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Because he was unable to meet his tuition payments as they
became due, Reynolds withdrew from the University of Massachu
setts. At the time of withdrawal Reynolds owed the university
more than $300. He then worked as a sawmill operator until Au
gust 1976, when hurricane winds toppled a tree onto the truck in
which he was riding, fracturing his skull and shattering a vertebra
in his back. Reynolds, probably relying on the Massachusetts defi
nition of veteran, did not apply for state medical and hospitalization
benefits available to veterans. 6
Claiming that the Massachusetts statute violated the first, fifth,
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution,
Reynolds filed a class action in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts. He named Michael Dukakis,7 Vahan
Vartanian,8 Robert Feeney,9 and Leroy Keith 10 as defendants and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants filed a mo
tion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. l l After oral argument on the motion,
the district court ordered the parties to file briefs on the question
of whether the Massachusetts statute violated the plaintiff's equal
protection rights. 12 After the briefs were filed, and without further
oral argument, the three-judge district court 13 held that the Massa
known reason, the Department of Education never made that decision. Brief for
Plaintiff at 2, Reynolds v. Dukakis, 441 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass. 1977).
6. The plaintiff's complaint was never "amended to allege that his failure to
apply for medical benefits as a veteran was based on the prior ruling that he could
not qualify [as a veteran]." 441 F. Supp. at 649. See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5,
at 3.
7. Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
8. Adjutant General and Commissioner of War Records of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts.
9. See note 5 supra.
10. Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education.
11. The Court disposed of this claim by ruling that subject matter jurisdiction
existed "on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331-federal question jurisdiction-and also on
the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1343-this case being a civil rights action alleged to arise
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." 441 F. Supp. at 649. The defendants also unsuccessfully
argued that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The defendants were successful, however, in their attempt to show that a class action
was unwarranted because the plaintiff failed to "establish the existence in fact of a
class 'so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical' . . . ." Id. at 650.
Therefore, the plaintiff failed to meet the class action requirements of FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(a)(I). Only nine persons could be considered potential class members.
12. Reynolds v. Dukakis, No. 75-5109-J (D. Mass., July 29, 1976).
13. The plaintiff applied for a three-judge court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. §§
2283-2284. Because the plaintiff sought an injunction against the operation of an al
legedly unconstitutional statute, the case was properly before the court. The court's
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chusetts statute was unconstitutional. The court found that a state
statute which denies veterans' benefits to an individual honorably
discharged as a conscientious objector was in conflict with the fed
eral scheme that awards benefits to honorably discharged conscien
tious objectors. 14
The Reynolds court reached a justifiable result. A strong ar
gument exists, however, that state legislation which bars veterans'
benefits to those discharged as conscientious objectors conflicts
with neither the federal policy underlying the discharge of con
scientious objectors nor the federal benefits to which conscientious
objectors are entitled. 15 Rather than relying on a strained conflict
with federal law, the court should have decided Reynolds on the
basis of equal protection and first amendment standards. The court
recognized
a serious equal protection problem in a statute, ... which with
holds veterans' benefits from a person who exercises what the
federal authorities have, at least by implication, found to be a
jurisdiction was maintained because the defendant made no valid allegations as to
the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. 441 F. Supp. at 648-50.
14. ld. at 653-54. "When a state legislature undertakes to enact legislation,
the effect of which would be to frustrate the congressional intention and to produce
results diametrically opposed to those sought by the federal law, the state legisla
tion must give way." ld. at 653. A state statute which denies veteran status to an
in-service conscientious objector, thereby barring his eligibility for veterans' ben
efits, "is clearly at cross purposes with the federal statutory scheme which now
places no sanctions on [an in-service conscientious objectorl." ld.
15. ld. at 655 (Julian, J., dissenting). The court found a conflict between the
federal and state statutes arising out of the state's denial of veteran status granted
Reynolds by Congress. The dissent saw no conflict because "[n]either the dis
charge of conscientious objectors . . . nor the granting to them of federal veterans'
benefits is in any way frustrated or impeded by enforcement of [the Massachusetts
statute]. There is no obligation on Massachusetts to supplement the benefits con
ferred by federal law on 1-0 conscientious objectors." ld. at 655 (citations omitted).
The federal benefits granted to veterans and the underlying policies of each are
codified in 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-1007 (1970 & Supp. III 1978). Generally, courts favor
decisions based on narrow grounds. If, for example, a state statute clearly violated
the fourteenth amendment, but addressed an area of law clearly pre-empted by
federal law, most courts would base their decision on the narrower pre-emption
grounds rather than the broader constitutional grounds. See Note, Pre-emption as
a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
Assuming, in Reynolds, that a legitimate conflict exists beween the state and fed
eral statutes, the conflict would appear to be the logical basis for decision. Where,
however, only a strained conflict exists, most courts would then dispose of a case
on constitutional grounds. In Reynolds, the plaintiff was eligible for, and did re
ceive, federal benefits. The Massachusetts statute infringed on neither the policy
nor the operation of federal law. Therefore, since here there is only a questionable
conflict, the court should have based its decision on equal protection grounds.
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free exercise right, while that same statute does not withhold
those same veterans' benefits from persons found by the military
service to be, [unsuitable for the service).16

The district court filed three opinions. Chief Judge Caffrey,
writing for the majority, found that a conflict existed between state
and federal law. Judge Aldrich, concurring, felt that the equal pro
tection argument deserved further consideration. Finally, Judge Ju
lian, in dissent, found neither that a conflict existed between state
and federal law nor that an equal protection argument was jus
tified.
1.

BACKGROUND

Conscientious objection to war is not a new concept in
America. Exemptions from military service for those who were
conscientiously opposed to war first appeared in colonial statutes
more than 100 years before the American Revolution. 17 "However,
the high cost of supporting a fighting militia and the general feeling
that those of nonresistant faith were 'getting off too easily' caused
most colonies to require the exempted person to either provide a
substitute to fight in their stead or to pay a commutation fee. "18 This
policy continued in various forms 19 until 1917 when personal mili
tary service became obligatory.
The Draft Act of 191720 exempted only those who could show
they belonged to well-recognized religious organizations whose
creed prohibited any mode of combatant participation. The lan
guage of this statute had the effect of denying military service ex
emptions to those having deeply rooted religious beliefs in oppo
sition to war simply because the religious organization of which they
were a member was not "well-recognized."
The "well-recognized" clause was finally omitted in 1940. It
was replaced by the requirement that one show that his opposition
to war was grounded in his religious training and belief.21 In order
16. Id. at 654.
17. Conscientious objectors were probably first exempted in 1673 by the colo
nial legislature in Rhode Island. See Russell, Development of Conscientious Objec
tor Recognition in the United States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409 (1952).
18. Id. at 414 (footnote omitted).
19. See Mass. Act of Oct. 19, 1664 (commutation fee), Mass. Act ofJan. 22, 1776
(exempting Quakers), Draft Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 731 (substitutions and commutation
fees), cited in Russell, supra note 17 (citing SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, CON
SCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 40-41 (Special Monograph 11, 1950».
20. Ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1917).
21. Selective Training and Service Act, ch. 720,54 Stat. 885 (1940).
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to be granted an exemption from military service as a conscientious
objector, an individual was required to show that his religious
training and belief centered around a "Supreme Being. "22
The "Supreme Being" standard soon proved to be inequitable
for those who were sincerely opposed to war but could not ground
their opposition upon a belief in a "God." In 1965, in United States
v. Seeger, 23 the Supreme Court developed a new test to determine
whether to exempt an applicant from military service on the basis
of conscientious objection. Although Seeger's religious beliefs were
sincere, he was convicted of refusing induction into the armed
forces because his belief was not grounded on a "Supreme Being."
Instead, Seeger believed in "goodness and virtue for their own
sakes and [had] a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. "24 After
recognizing the broad scope of the term "religion," the Court
enunciated the new standard for conscientious objector exemptions:
"[D]oes the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the
objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly
qualified for exemption?"25 In order to gain an exemption based on
conscientious objection, therefore, one must object to war in any
form and show that his objection stems from religious training and
belief. 26
Once an individual is classified as a conscientious objector he
is then subclassified as either opposed to any form of participation
in any war or opposed only to service in combat. The members of
the former group are classified as 1_027 while those in the latter
22. Id.
23. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
24. Id. at 166.
25. Id. at 184. The Seeger decision, however, provided very little insight re
garding the definitional limits of "religious training and belief." Congress defined
religious training and belief as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not
including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely per
sonal moral code." Id. at 172 (citing Selective Training and Service Act, ch. 720, 54
Stat. 885 (1940), as amended by Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 604 (1948)). This
amendment was the result of the decision in Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377
(9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946), which held that philosophical, so
cial, or political beliefs were not included in the definition of religious training and
belief. Five years after Seeger, however, the Supreme Court indicated that philos
ophical, social, and political beliefs may fit within the definition of religious training
and belief. Welsh v. United States, 298 U.S. 333 (1970). In Welsh, the plaintiff did
not view his beliefs as being of a religious nature. The Court, however, noted the
sincerity of his convictions and held that Welsh's beliefs were within the broad
scope of the term "religious" as stated by the Seeger Court. Id. at 343.
26. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456(j) (1970).
27. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.14(a) (1977).

398

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:393

group are classified as l-A-O.28
Those classified as l-A-O actively serve in the military in a
noncombatant function. 29 If their service has been satisfactory, they
receive an honorable discharge and are entitled to all federal bene
fits available to veterans. Those classified as 1-0 are assigned to
alternate civilian service. 3o When the 1-0 has completed his tour of
duty, however, he is not entitled to veterans' benefits because he
has not actively served in the military and, therefore, cannot be
classified as a veteran. 31
In 1962, provisions were made to cover the situation where an
individual claims to be a conscientious objector after his induction
into the service. 32 One may apply for a conscientious objection
exemption after induction only if the belief upon which the applica
tion is grounded arose after induction. 33
If the in-service conscientious objector is granted a l-A-O
classification, he will be transferred to noncombatant duty or dis
charged. 34 There is nothing on the l-A-O discharge to indicate that
conscientious objection is the reason for severance from the ser
vice. 35 The discharged l-A-O is eligible for all federal and state vet
erans' benefits unless, for other reasons, he received an other
than-honorable discharge.
If the in-service conscientious objector is granted a 1-0 classi
fication, he is usually discharged. 36 Unlike the in-service l-A-O,
however, a notation is made on the in-service 1-0's discharge that
the severance is the result of conscientious objection. 37 The nota
tion of conscientious objection is made solely for the purpose of
avoiding later confusion. 38 The notation in no way affects one's right
to receive federal veterans' benefits. Massachusetts, however, used
28. Id. § 1622.11.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1622.14(a).
31. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
32. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (Aug. 21, 1962). See generally Com
ment, God, the Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector,
56 CALIF. L. REV. 379 (1968).
33. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6, § IV(B)(2) (May 10, 1968). See
Grubb v. Birdsong, 452 F.2d 516 (6th CiT. 1971).
34. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 75.7(b) (1977).
35. Id.
36. The discharge is granted for the convenience of the government. Dep't of
Defense Directive No. 1300.6, § VI(C)(l) (May 10, 1968).
37. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 75.7(a) (1977).
38. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6, § VI(C)(l)(a) (May 10, 1968).
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this notation as the basis for denial of veterans' benefits to any ap
plicant who fit within the class. 39
II.

FEDERAL VETERANS' BENEFITS

Congress passed veterans' benefits legislation as part of its
function to make all laws necessary and proper to raise and support
armies. 4o These benefits were intended as compensation to those
whose lives were significantly disrupted by military service. 41 The
benefits were also intended to aid veterans in re-adjusting to civi
lian life. 42
Originally, benefits flowed only to those veterans who received
injuries in the service. After World War II, however, legislation
was passed which recognized all veterans as eligible to receive
benefits. Since World War II, the nature of the benefits offered has
changed but the basic premise-that all veterans· are eligible for
benefits43-has not changed.
Under federal law, "[t]he term 'veteran' means a person who
served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was
discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dis
honorable. "44 Whether one is entitled to collect federal veterans'
benefits upon severance from the service depends on the type of
discharge he received. 45 Regulations, established by the Depart
ment of Defense and made applicable to all military branches, gave
certain superior officers discretion to grant different types of dis
charges based on a serviceman's record. 46 Since conscientious ob
jection is not grounds for a dishonorable discharge, anyone granted
a l-A-O or 1-0 classification after induction is eligible for federal
veterans' benefits unless he fails to meet some other element in
cluded within the federal definition of a "veteran." The notation
that the reason for severance was conscientious objection receives
no consideration in the determination of eligibility for federal bene
fits.

39. See ~iass. GEN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(43) (Michie/Law Co-op 1973).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
41. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
42. Id.
43. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(a) (1977) "[r]econgize[s] the claims of
bona fide conscientious objectors in the military service...."
44. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1970).
45. National Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 75.7 (1977).
46. Id. § 41.
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VETERANS' BENEFITS IN MASSACHUSETTS

The Massachusetts definition of "veteran" differs markedly
from the federal definition. In pertinent part, the Massachusetts
legislature has defined the term "veteran" to exclude "[a]ny person
who was designated as a conscientious objector upon his last dis
charge or release from the armed forces of the United States."47
There is no legislative history available to describe the purpose
of the Massachusetts statute. The 1954 statute was probably passed
in accordance with the then prevalent federal policy aimed at
punishing those in the service who refused to obey orders or wear
a military uniform. 48 Those exhibiting this type of behavior were
dishonorably discharged without regard to the consideration that
conscience may have been the motivating factor behind the be
havior. By 1962, however, the federal attitude toward conscientious
objectors was more in line with current policy: It is more important
to recognize a person's religious rights than it is to force him to
serve in the military.49 In 1962, the Department of Defense first
implemented a policy for the discharge of those who validly
claimed to be conscientiously opposed to war of any kind. 50 If the
individual's service record was satisfactory a discharge under hon
orable conditions was granted, and the serviceman was entitled to
full federal veterans' benefits. If the individual's service record was
marred by his refusal to wear the uniform or to obey orders and
carry out his assigned duties, the serviceman received a discharge
47. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(43) (Michie/Law Co-op 1973).
48. 441 F. Supp. at 652. This was a major thrust of plaintiff's argument. Con
scientious objectors were first excluded from receiving federal benefits by the 1918
amendments to the Federal War Risk Insurance Act, ch. lO4, 40 Stat. 609, 609-lO
(1918), where they were classified with deserters and enemy aliens. A 1918 amend
ment to the Espionage Act of 1917 imposed fines and prison sentences on those who
refused induction. The punitive nature of these acts demonstrates the strong public
sentiment against conscientious objectors. In 1919, Massachusetts passed a statute
granting employment preference to veterans. Conscientious objectors were excluded
by this act. 1919 Mass. Acts ch. 150, § 1. The language of this statute was substan
tially similar to that of the Federal War Risk Insurance Act, ch. 104, 40 Stat. 609,
609-lO (1918). The language of the statute at issue in Reynolds, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 4, § 7(43), is substantially similar to the 1919 Massachusetts Employment Prefer
ence Act. Since the 1919 Act was aimed at reaching the conscientious objectors who
failed to take orders, refused to wear the uniform, and exhibited general disruptive
behavior, it is not unreasonable to conclude that MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(43) was
punitively designed with the same objectives in mind. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note
5, at 20-34.
49. See 38 U.S.C. § 3lO3 (1959); 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1967). See also Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
50. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (Aug. 21, 1962).
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under other-than-honorable conditions and was not eligible for fed
eral veterans' benefits. 51 This policy is still in effect. 52
The Massachusetts provision excluding conscientious objectors
from veteran status has not been amended since its passage in
1954. It contains substantially the same language as a 1919 statute
which was designed as a punitive measure against those conscien
tiously opposed to war. 53 The continuation of the same language im
plies that the statute at issue was also designed as a punitive meas
ure against conscientious objectors.
IV. . EQUAL

PROTECTION

The fourteenth amendment guarantees that "[n]o state shall
. deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws. "54
The Constitution does not, however, guarantee absolute equality to
every person. The fourteenth amendment prevents unequal treat
ment of people who are similarly situated by forbidding state ac
tion which results in arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination.
A statute, by its very nature,· must classify people into differ
ent groups for different purposes. The fourteenth amendment does
not deny a state the right to make statutory classifications. To the
contrary, a statute's strength depends upon an effective classifica
tion scheme. When a state makes classifications based upon recog
nized differences between people, there must be a reasonable basis
for the classification. In addition, the distinguishing feature upon
which the classification has been made must have a reasonable rela
tion to the legislative purpose. 55

5l. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 23-29. See note 44 supra and accompany
ing text. A veteran is one who receives a discharge under other-than-dishonorable
conditions. This is a condition precedent to the right to receive either state or federal
veterans' benefits. Certainly, one who receives an honorable discharge is eligible for
veterans' benefits. As discussed in the text accompanying note 61 infra, one who
receives a general discharge for unsuitability to the service may also be eligible for
Massachusetts veterans' benefits as well as federal veterans' benefits.
52. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (May 10, 1968).
53. See note 48 supra.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l.
55. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). If a state enactment
classifies all persons who have received a law degree into a group, it may be said
that there is a reasonable basis for identifying the common group characteristic. If
the state enactment goes further to say that this class is the only class entitled to
practice law in the state, it may be said that there is a reasonable relation between
the classification made and the statutory purpose. On the other hand, if the state
enactment says that only those persons who have received law degrees are entitled
to practice medicine in the state, the enactment has exceeded the bounds of reason.
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Each statutory classification includes some groups and excludes
others. Some classifications may operate to exclude individuals who
are similarly situated to those who are included by the classifica
tion. The legislature must have a reasonable basis for each
classification. 56 When there is no reasonable basis for differentiat
ing between groups, that is, no rational relation between the chal
lenged classification and the purpose of the statute, the state has
violated the equal protection clause.
In Reynolds, the statute barring veteran status to conscientious
objectors classifies servicemen into two groups. Both groups re
ceived discharges under other-than-dishonorable conditions. The
first group is composed of those who honorably completed their
term of service. and those who were discharged before completing
their term o( service because they were unsuitable for the service.
Also included in this first group are those who were discharged as
l-A-O conscientious objectors because they were opposed only to
participation in combat. All members of this group are classified as
veterans and are eligible to receive veterans' benefits in Massachu
setts. The second group is made up of those discharged honorably
with a notation of conscientious objector because of their opposition
to participation in war in any form and, therefore, classified as 1-0.
The members of this group are not classified as veterans and,
therefore, are not entitled to receive state veterans' benefits.
The plaintiff argued that the classifications made by the statute
are, at the same time, both overinclusive and underinclusive. 57
The classification is overinclusive because it denies benefits to all
conscientious objectors classified as 1-0 regardless of the length of
their active service. 58 Most 1-0 conscientious objectors are never
inducted into the service. Instead, they perform alternate civilian
service. Therefore, they never actively serve in the military and
are not entitled to benefits because they are not veterans. 59 The
plaintiff was not similarly situated to this group of 1-0 conscientious
objector. Reynolds performed four and a half years of active miliThere is no rational relationship between the classification scheme and the purpose
of the statute.
56. See id. For instance, if a legislative act states that only those lawyers over
six feet may practice law in the state, the state has arbitrarily and unreasonably dis
criminated among two similarly situated groups. Lawyers over six feet tall are bene
fited by this statute. Lawyers under six feet tall, however, are unreasonably burdened.
57. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 4-11.

58. ld.
59. See Johnson v. Robis0n, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Zweig, Military Law, 1976
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 687, 699-700.
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tary service. By including Reynolds in the same group as all I-Os,
the statute includes more people than necessary to accomplish its
purpose of providing benefits to veterans.
The classification is underinclusive because, on the one hand,
it grants benefits to l-A-O conscientious objectors who have actively
served in the military and, on the other hand, denies benefits to
1-0 conscientious objectors who have actively served in the mili
tary.60 By excluding Reynolds from the class of conscientious objec
tors who have actively served in the military, the statutory purpose
is not accomplished because more people than necessary have been
excluded. The classification also grants benefits to those discharged
because of their unsuitability to the service. Persons severed from
the service in this manner include homosexuals, abusers of alcohol,
those who exhibit unsanitary habits and personality disorders as
well as those who are apathetic, have defective attitudes or are
unable to expend their effort constructively.61 If these individuals
have otherwise satisfactory service records, they receive a discharge
under other-than-dishonorable conditions and are entitled to re
ceive both federal and state veterans' benefits. Thus the statutory
classification is again underinclusive because, by excluding Rey
nolds from the class composed of unsuitables, it includes fewer
persons than necessary to accomplish its purpose. 62
60. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 4-11. The dissent adopted the view that
Reynolds was not similarly situated with I-A-O conscientious objectors and those dis
charged for unsuitability to the service. The view is grounded on the voluntary na
ture of the plaintiff's initiation of his discharge. Irrespective of their personal prefer
ences, the government initiates the discharge of I-A-O conscientious objectors and
those found to be unsuitable. 441 F. Supp. at 656. Judge Aldrich, in his concurring
opinion, effectively met this argument by observing that the conduct of a conscien
tious objector--expressing his convictions and initiating his own discharge-is no
more voluntary than the conduct of one which leads to a discharge for unsuitability.
This argument is strengthened by the fact that those experiencing the requisite de
gree of hardship may initiate their own discharge without incurring either state or
federal sanction. [d. at 654-55. Thus, the dissent's finding that 1-0 conscientious ob
jectors are not similarly situated with I-A-O conscientious objectors and those found
to be unsuitable because of the voluntary/involuntary distinction is subject to three
criticisms. First, following the dictates of one's conscience may, in fact, be an essen
tially involuntary act. Second, initiation of a discharge for "hardship" may be an
essentially voluntary act. Finally, the conduct leading to a finding of unsuitability is
often voluntary.
61. See AIR FORCE MANUAL, 39-12, c(ll) (July 20, 1976).
62. The Massachusetts statute, however, makes it possible for a person to ac
tively serve the minimum 180 days and subsequently be discharged for unsuitability
to the service and yet remain eligible for veterans' benefits. Reynolds, however, who
meritoriously served four and a half years before being discharged, was ineligible for
veterans' benefits.
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It is not argued here that l-A-O conscientious objectors and
unsuitables discharged after active service should not receive such
benefits. However, the purposes of granting veterans' benefits are
compensation for disruption to one's life,63 reward for virtuous mil
itary service,64 and stimulation of military service. 65 Granting bene
fits to Reynolds fulfills the statute's purposes as much as granting
benefits to l-A-O conscientious objectors and those discharged for
unsuitability .
The Reynolds court recognized "that there appears to be a
serious equal protection problem"66 in the Massachusetts statute
but found it unnecessary to decide the issue. Reynolds was simi
larly situated with all others who were eligible to receive veterans'
benefits. Because of an unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious
classification scheme, however, Reynolds was denied the status of
veteran and the accompanying benefits. Since there was no rational
basis for the classification scheme and since there was no rational
relation between the classification and a legitimate state goal, the
Massachusetts statute should have been struck down as a violation
of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
V.

FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM

Reynolds also argued that the Massachusetts statutory scheme
should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny because the classifica
tion interferes with the fundamental constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion. 67 A similar argument was advanced in Johnson
v. Robison 68 where a conscientious objector who never served in
the military was denied veterans' benefits. There, the United
States Supreme Court held that the denial of benefits was, at most,
"an incidental burden upon appellee's free exercise of religion, "69
and that the government's substantial interest in raising and sup
porting armies was "clearly sufficient to sustain the challenged
legislation. "70
63. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
64. Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 657 (1939) (Ronan, J., concurring).
See also Brieffor Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 17.
65. Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Serv., 361 Mass. 480, 281 N.E.2d 53 (1972);
Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 647 (1939).
66. 441 F. Supp. at 654.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
69. [d. at 385.
70. [d.
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The crucial distinction, however, between Robison and
Reynolds is that Reynolds had already served four and a half years
of active military service. He paid the price for veterans'benefits,
both in terms of virtuous military service and disruption of his civil
ian life.71 Robison, on the other hand, received his 1-0 exemption
before induction and claimed veterans' benefits because he per
formed alternate civilian service. He freely chose, prospectively,
between active military service, with its attendant benefits, and al
ternate civilian service without those benefits. 72 Although Robison
holds that denying benefits to one who had not earned them did
not interfere with the free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court
has held that no religious test may be used as a barrier to gov
ernmental benefits. 73 In Sherbert v. Verner,74 a Seventh-Day Ad
ventist was discharged from her employment because of her refusal
to work on her day of worship and was, for the same reason, un
able to find other employment. Her subsequent application for un
employment compensation benefits was denied on the grounds that
she had failed without good cause to accept other suitable work.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's right to free exercise of
religion was violated by the state's denial of benefits. 75 Accepting
other employment would have infringed upon the plaintiff's deeply
held religious beliefs. The' Court found no compelling state interest
to uphold the denial of benefits. 76 No invidious state discriminatory
scheme may stand in the face of the vital interest in the free exer
cise of religion to which we are all entitled. In Reynolds, as in
Sherbert, the plaintiff was faced with a choice of abandoning the
religious dictates of his conscience or suffering from the denial of
governmental benefits he justly deserved.
The Sherbert rationale is more instructive regarding the prin
cipal case than is Robison because the nature of the choice in
Sherbert more closely resembles Reynolds's choice. Both plaintiffs
were denied state government benefits that they were already enti
tled to but for their exercising their freedom of religion. Applying
the Sherbert analysis to Reynolds, the court would have required
the state to justify the statutory scheme by showing a compelling

71. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
72. 415 U.S. at 385 n.19.
73. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
74. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
75. Id. at 403. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
76. 374 U.S. at 409.
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interest. In as much as there was no state interest capable of satis
fying the less demanding rational basis test,77 the statute would
surely fall when subjected to closer judicial scrutiny. 78
The sole distinction between Reynolds and Sherbert is that
Reynolds was denied educational benefits while Sherbert was de
nied unemployment benefits. The distinction does not appear sig
nificant enough to make a difference. Statutory classifications
should not place one in the position of choosing between his con
science and his education. Since the free exercise of religion is a
fundamental constitutional right, strict scrutiny should have been
applied. Sherbert makes clear that incidental burdens on free exer
cise of religion are not to be tolerated unless the state can show a
compelling interest which justifies the burden. 79
The Massachusetts statute barring the plaintiff from receiving
veterans' benefits did not operate directly on the plaintiff's right to
freely exercise his religious convictions. 8o Reynolds encountered no
direct obstructions in the actual conduct of following his con
77. 441 F. Supp. at 654-55 (Aldrich J., concurring).
78. The court did not address the issue.
79. In Sherbert, the plaintiff was ineligible for state benefits solely because she
chose to adhere to her religious beliefs. The state ruling barring her from receiving
unemployment benefits
force[d] her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental im
position of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exer
cise of religion as would a fine imposed against appella'Ilt for her Saturday
worship.
Nor may the [state] court's construction of the statute be saved from
constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation
benefits are not appellant's "right" but merely a "privilege." It is too late in
the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be in
fringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (footnote omitted). See Stevens v. Ber-·
ger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Ky. 1977); Lincoln v. True, 408 F. Supp. 22 (W.O. Ky.
1975).
Despite the overwhelming frequency with which the courts have faithfully
recited the formula that the [conscientious objector] exemption is simply a
matter of legislative grace, one should not summarily dismiss the constitu
tional argument. With increasing vigor in recent years, the commentators
have argued that there is more to this question than the courts have been
willing to admit, suggesting that the Supreme Court might now speak differ
ently on the subject should Congress attempt to withdraw its grant of grace.
Comment, supra note 32, at 398. See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 12-15.
80. Governmental regulation of religious belief is clearly unconstitutional.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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science. The statute does, however, indirectly burden the plain
tiff's free exercise right. Because the statute denied veteran status
to Reynolds, he did not receive the benefits necessary for the con
tinuation of his education. Therefore, the operation of the statute
had the effect of inhibiting in-service conscientious objectors from
following their conscience.
In Reynolds, the state would not be able to meet its burden of
showing a compelling interest. There is no state interest which can
validly be claimed as compelling. 81 The Massachusetts classification
interferes with the plaintiff's freedom of religion and is, therefore,
an invidious discriminatory act.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The district court decided Reynolds on the ground that there
was a direct conflict between federal and state law. The nature of
that conflict is unclear. A motion, now pending, has been filed for
clarification of the judgment. Probably the court meant that when a
state law is in conflict with a federal law the state law must fall. It
is true that the supremacy clause makes federal law dominant over
state law. It is also true that the pre-emption doctrine denies a
state the right to legislate in certain areas. In Reynolds, however,
there is no direct conflict between state and federal law. Nor is the
legislative field of granting benefits to veterans flooded to the point
of excluding state legislation. Each state may grant additional bene
fits to veterans if it so desires.
The Reynolds court reached the correct result, but did not
support its decision on the most persuasive grounds. The court
recognized an equal protection problem in Reynolds but did not
decide the issue. The court should have dealt with this issue di
rectly. The class of servicemen discharged as 1-0 conscientious ob
jectors is similarly situated with all other veterans who are eligible
to receive veterans' benefits. There is no rational basis upon which
such classification can be grounded.
Even if a rational basis could be found, there is no compelling
state interest to satisfY a strict scrutiny test. Reynolds was a victim
81. 441 F. Supp. at 653. See Comment, supra note 32. The state may assert an
interest in maintaining already trained recruits adequate in number to protect our
country. ld. at 399. But cf. Gillette Y. United States, 401 U.S. 437,462 (1971); Braun
feld Y. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (if the interest is compelling, the court must
determine that there is no other way the state could accomplish its purpose).
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of an invidious state discriminatory scheme which violated his fun
damental constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. Since
the Massachusetts statute distinguishes between veterans solely on
the grounds of their religious beliefs, the statute should have been
strictly scrutinized and found to be inherently unreasonable and,
therefore, unconstitutional.

David B. Schultz

